Thursday, May 23, 2013

Gatsby's Illusory Green Light

I read The Great Gatsby about a decade ago when I was in high school. I recently saw the film adaptation starring Leonardo DiCaprio, which inspired me to re-read the book.
Leonardo DiCaprio as Jay Gatsby. Image from The Week.


I remembered certain things from the book, but other things eluded my grasp, so I read the book again to make sure the film had gotten the story right, or to get it right in my head at least. I had remembered the beautiful beginning and end to the novel, but had somehow lost everything in between.

F. Scott Fitzgerald begins the novel by writing:
In my younger and more vulnerable years my father gave me some advice that I've been turning over in my mind ever since. 
'Whenever you feel like criticizing anyone,' he told me, 'just remember that all the people in this world haven't have had the advantages that you've had.'
My father told me the same thing many times throughout my childhood and adolescence, and it has stuck with me ever since, too. Not in any practical sense—I judge people terribly all day—but of course, "reserving judgments is a matter of infinite hope." Or, as Jesus perhaps more eloquently put it, "judge not that you shall be judged." Which is to say: if Jesus had to take the time to point out the difficulty of avoiding judgments, then it's obviously not an easy habit to kick no matter how much Nick Carraway and I remember being told by our fathers to lighten up on our fellow man. 

Fitzgerald closes with some of the most unforgettable language I've ever read:
He had come a long way to this blue lawn and his dream must have seemed so close that he could hardly fail to grasp it. He did not know that it was already behind him, somewhere back in that vast obscurity beyond the city, where the dark fields of the republic rolled on under the night. 
Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgastic future that year by year recedes before us. It eluded us then, but that's no matter—tomorrow we will run faster, stretch out our arms farther....And on fine morning——
So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.
Alas, it does matter that Gatsby's green light eluded him, that it eludes all of us who continue to be borne back into a past that doesn't exist, a past that we chase endlessly into an illusory future.

When I read the book in high school, I was quite fond of Gatsby. I ignored or was too unaware to notice that he was a bootlegger, a glorified gangster, a swindler, a liar, and a man who stayed in love with the wrong woman at the cost of his life ultimately. When I read the book the first time, I believed in the green light and the orgastic future. I was a dreamer. I used to make the same lists that Gatsby made, the list that Gatsby's father proudly displays to Carraway as proof of his dead son's vision for his boundless future. You have to have a pretty bright future in mind to make a list laying out your self-imposed spartan schedule with admonishments to yourself to be even better than the list indicates you already are.


Gatsby's future was the dream of a poor man wanting to get rich, to make something of himself to be acceptable to the wealthy woman he had fallen in love with, and to be good enough in his own eyes to be worthy of that woman's love. Since pulling yourself up by your own bootstraps is more of an American myth than a reality, Gatsby had to resort to unsavory means and associations with unsavory characters like Meyer Wolfsheim to make his fortune. I guess since I didn't grow up poor I can't relate to that aspect of Gatsby's dream, and thus should reserve judgment on the nature of his wealth accumulation. If you don't grow up without, perhaps it's harder to care about money as you project your future. But I can certainly relate to wanting be wealthy, and particularly in the sense that it probably does help one's love life.

The green light that once fueled my existence flamed out much sooner than Gatsby's did. Gatsby probably wouldn't have been able to live without that vision for his future, so perhaps it's better that it ended the way it did for him.

I guess after reading the book this time I felt more of a bond with Tom Buchanan, whom Fitzgerald says is, "one of those men who reach such an acute limited excellence at twenty-one that everything afterwards savours of anti-climax...but I felt that Tom would drift on forever seeking a little wistfully for the dramatic turbulence of some irrecoverable football game."

Today, during one of my last days of work at my current job, instead of actually working, I hopped up on my desk to peer over at my co-worker over the cubicle wall that separates us.

"This feels like the last days of high school. The only difference is that this time the authorities don't seem to care that I no longer care, and still expect me to show up and work," I say.

He laughs and says, "I thought you were going to say the only difference is that you got laid more back then."

"Well, that's true, too," I reply. I look away, pause, and stare out at the ocean beyond the glass conference room that surrounds the station of cubicles where we toil. Still standing on my desk like an idiot, I say, "I flamed out at 17." Quickly trying to avoid the potential truth in that terrible statement, I peer over to another co-worker and ask him what the fuck he's doing. He replies but I don't really hear what he says, and I sit back down and think about working, but don't. I spend the rest of the afternoon distracting myself enough to avoid work and eventually head home to write this.

Every so often I get the vision of the green light again. I'll imagine myself as sports writing's next Tom Verducci and that will motivate me for a bit. But then I'm faced with the limitations of the powers of my cognition, and perhaps even worse, my lack of connections, and it all seems feeble so as not to bother with anymore.

I don't think Gatsby could have lived his life if he had realized that his dreams were already behind him. There was a sense in the book of that reality creeping in on him at times, and he willfully ignores it. He tells Carraway that he's wrong, you can recreate the past, old sport.

You can't recreate the past. But, why would you even want to? It's okay to be alive after your dreams of grandeur have died. Even after the green light fades, most of us drive "on toward death through the cooling twilight."

It's not so bad, you just have to try a little to appreciate the setting sun, the twilight, the rolling waves of the ocean just beyond your cubicle wall. It's a lot easier than chasing the impossible dreams and grasping endlessly for the dead, illusory past.

Wednesday, May 22, 2013

Giants Notes: Cain Pitches Like an Ace

In the first inning of the San Francisco Giants' 4-2 win over the Washington Nationals on Tuesday night, there was the feeling of 'here-we-go-again' with ace right-hander Matt Cain. Catcher Buster Posey set up for an inside fastball to Ryan Zimmerman, but Cain missed the target and threw the ball right down the middle. Zimmerman blasted the meatball for an RBI double:

Cain's mistake to Zimmerman. (Image courtesy of Brooks Baseball).
That was a 90-mile-per-hour fastball right down the pipe. Later in the inning, Cain hung a slider to Ian Desmond, who lined it down the right field line for another double. The Giants were suddenly down 2-0 against one of the nastiest pitchers in baseball, Stephen Strasburg.

The hanging fastball to Zimmerman and the hanging slider to Desmond were indicative of the command problems that have plagued Cain all year. His fastball velocity and strikeout rate are virtually the same as last season when he pitched like an ace. His average fastball was 91.2 mph last year compared to 90.8 so far this season. His strikeout rate was 22 percent last season compared to 21.1 percent this season. The problem has not been his stuff. The issue has been command.

Cain has a 5.12 ERA this year because he's consistently made the types of location mistakes that he made to Zimmerman and Desmond in the first inning on Tuesday night. He allowed only 30 home runs combined over the 2011 and 2012 seasons. He's already allowed 13 home runs in 63.1 innings this season. Some of that is just bad luck that should eventually turn around. Perhaps in prior years, Zimmerman would have popped up Cain's middle-middle fastball and we wouldn't have thought much of it. However, for whatever reason, Cain isn't getting away with his mistakes thus far in 2013. He's allowed 17.6 percent of the fly balls hit off of him to leave the yard this season compared to his career average of 7.2 percent.

On the bright side, Cain didn't seem to make any location mistakes after the first inning. He didn't allow another run over his final six innings of work. His stuff improved as the game went along. His fastball was only 89-91 in the early innings but he pumped it up to 91-93 by the end of the outing as he seemed to find a more consistent set of mechanics. His changeup was an exceptional pitch for him throughout the game. He threw 29 of them, and the Nationals swung-and-missed 10 times against it.

Cain looked like the ace of old against the Nationals, and he's looked very good at times throughout his first 10 starts. He's delivered a quality start in six of his 10 turns through the rotation. However, in a few of his outings, he's gotten into ruts where he just can't seem to hit Posey's glove. Instead of missing out of the zone, he's hanging the ball right over the plate and paying the price for his location mistakes. After the first inning on Tuesday night, Cain decided that there just wouldn't be any more pitches to hit for the Nationals. Of all the struggling Giants pitchers, Cain seems to be the best bet to turn things around this year.

Marco Scutaro extended his hitting streak to 19 games and lifted his average to .337. He's hit .352 in 103 games since Brian Sabean acquired him at last season's trading deadline. That's a pretty nice feather in the cap for Sabey-Sabes, and for me as well. Prior to the 2012 season, I argued that the Giants should have acquired Scutaro. I wrote:
Scutaro, 36, hit a robust .299/.358/.423 (BA/OBP/SLG) last year for the Red Sox while rating slightly above average defensively according to Ultimate Zone Rating and Defensive Runs Saved. While those numbers are hardly Ruthian, they represent a huge upgrade for the Giants, who watched their shortstops "hit" a league-worst .210/.265/.299 last year. Besides having saber-friendly accolades, he also has some of the intangibles Brian Sabean loves: he almost never strikes out (8.1% strike-out rate last year, third best in baseball), he looks gritty in uniform and he's old. What isn't to love here?
When Sabean finally got my man, I wrote at the time of the trade:
There are also signs that Scutaro could have a much better second half of the season. His .288 batting average on balls in play (BABIP) is very low considering that he has hit line drives 25 percent of the time that he's put the ball in play, which is in the top 15 in all of baseball.....There's also the upside that he may start having better luck and revert to his outstanding 2011 form. In that case, the Giants would be getting more than just a bench bat. No matter how the Giants choose to use Scutaro, they made themselves better on Friday night at a very minimal cost.
I didn't think Scutaro would hit .352 for the Giants and win the NLCS MVP, but I'm not surprised that he's been a solid contributor.

Nor am I surprised that Gregor Blanco has helped the Giants over the last year-plus. I touched on his merits last spring training when he was fighting to make the team. He not only made the squad, but he became a key contributor to last year's championship team. He's continued to thrive so far this season.

After a three-hit game last night including a game-tying triple in the ninth inning, Blanco's slash line is up to .293/.354/.379. The Giants are getting enough power from the rest of the lineup to be able to live with Blanco's .379 slugging percentage. His batting average, on-base percentage, speed and defense combine to make him an above-average regular in left field right now despite his lack of home run power.

Stephen Strasburg is filthy. His changeup is an 80-grade pitch on the 20-80 scouting scale. He throws it between 88-91 mph with heavy sink and armside run. If you can strikeout Buster Posey with the same pitch in two straight at-bats as Strasburg did, well, you've got an elite pitch. Oh, and he also throws a 94-97 mph fastball and a sharp 79-82 mph curveball. Good luck against that.

Luckily for the Giants, Strasburg was out after seven innings, Blanco saved the day with the game-tying triple and then Pablo Sandoval won it in the tenth with a gargantuan home run to right-center. 

Tuesday, May 21, 2013

Scouting Notes From Giants Win Over Nationals

http://www.getrealbaseball.com/scouting-notes-from-giants-win-over-nationals/

Here are some scouting notes that I took during the Giants 8-0 route of the Washington Nationals on Monday night:

Ryan Vogelsong looked like the standout pitcher of old before fracturing his right hand in an at-bat in the fifth inning. Vogelsong threw five shutout innings before the injury. He featured an 89-92 mile-per-hour fastball and sinker, an 87-90 mile-per-hour cutter, an 83-84 mile-per-hour changeup and a 76-78 mile-per-hour curve.

For the first time all season, Vogelsong consistently drove his fastball and sinker down in the zone to get groundballs. He induced seven groundball outs over five innings of work.

He had his best combination of velocity, command and control since last postseason when he went 3-0 with a 1.09 ERA over four starts. Vogelsong also showed the tremendous pitchability that helped him go 27-16 with a 3.05 ERA over the past two seasons. Vogelsong doesn't have put-way stuff, but his arsenal played up in 2011 and 2012 because of how well he sequenced his pitches.

In a two-pitch sequence to Ian Desmond on Monday, Vogelsong threw an 88-mile-per-hour cutter with movement away followed by a 90-mile-per-hour sinker on the hands with movement into Desmond, who popped it up to shallow right field. The next time he faced Desmond, he started him off with another cutter for a called strike before dropping a slow curve that Desmond popped up to second base.

Another good example of sequencing came when Vogelsong threw Roger Bernadina three straight changeups below the zone before pumping a high four-seam fastball right by him for a strikeout.

Perhaps the most impressive sequence of the night was against Adam LaRoche in the fourth inning. Vogelsong induced an inning-ending double-play with the following sequence: 88-mph cutter away, 81-mph changeup away, 91-mph sinker inside, 88-mph cutter away, 81-mph changeup away, 88-mph cutter away, 90-mph fastball inside, 91-mph sinker away for the double-play.

Vogelsong mixed his pitches incredibly well last night. According to Brooks Baseball, he threw 24 fastballs, 21 sinkers, 15 cutters, 11 changeups and eight curves. His ability to mix his pitches, change speeds and move the ball in and out kept the Nationals off balance.

Through his first eight starts, he was consistently missing his spots. Instead of pounding the knees, the ball was getting up in the zone too often and his velocity was also down a few ticks. That combination of reduced velocity and declining command was why he entered play last night with an 8.06 ERA and 11 home runs allowed in 41.1 innings pitched. On Monday night, the velocity was good, the command was even better and the pitchability was exceptional. Unfortunately, the Giants will now have to scramble for a sixth starter for the first time since Vogelsong replaced an injured Barry Zito in the rotation two years ago.

Marco Scutaro is squaring up everything right now, just as he did throughout the second half of last season and the playoffs. His current 18-game hitting streak has boosted his average all the way up to .333. He's the second hardest player in all of baseball to strikeout according to FanGraphs. Scutaro has only struck out in 6.5 percent of his plate appearances this season because his swing is very linear and short to the ball. His compact swing won't allow him to hit for much power, but he's a line drive-down hitter who is nearly impossible to strikeout during the height of the Strikeout Era. His bat is showing no signs of slowing down, but his defense at second base has been a problem this year, as he's made eight errors already.

Brandon Belt had a 4-for-5 night including a mammoth home run to give him six on the year, nearly matching last season's total of seven already. After an atrocious April (.235/.287/.353), Belt is hitting .302/.393/.604 thus far in May. Belt is probably always going to be inconsistent because of his complicated hitting mechanics. However, he's an outstanding defensive first baseman with decent speed and very good plate discipline, so he can help the Giants even when he's in one of his prolonged funks at the plate. Why Bruce Bochy continues to sit him against some lefties is beyond my poor powers of comprehension. Belt has a higher career OPS against lefties (.779 in 224 PA) than righties (.759 in 612 PA).

The Giants offense has been outstanding this season despite a poor start from the leadoff man, Angel Pagan. Pagan doesn't strikeout much, but he's also not as patient as the prototypical leadoff hitter ought to be. He's only walking 7.1 percent of the time this season, which is below the typical league average of 8.0 percent and well below where a leadoff man should be. His .310 on-base percentage is unacceptable right now, especially for a guy who just earned a $40-million contract. He's not exactly looking like Willie Mays out in center field, either. Perhaps Pagan would get more calls and walk more if he didn't bitch at the umpires after seemingly every single pitch.

Monday, May 20, 2013

Michael Kickham Should Replace Ryan Vogelsong for the San Francisco Giants

http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1646544-michael-kickham-should-replace-ryan-vogelsong-for-the-san-francisco-giants

Examining the Flaws with the Sabermetric Movement

http://www.getrealbaseball.com/examining-the-flaws-with-the-sabermetric-movement/

Colin Wyers of Baseball Prospectus wrote a fantastic piece last week examining some of the current issues with sabermetrics. Reporter Jon Heyman, who isn't exactly a stat-head, posed this question on Twitter: "i like war [wins above replacement]. but heres my war mystery of the week. mark reynolds .988 ops, 0.8 war; elliot johnson .641 ops, 0.9 war."

Apparently, Heyman was then attacked for his "ignorant" tweet. Wyers used that as a jumping off point for his larger article on some of the issues with WAR, namely that it's an estimate being treated as concrete fact by many in the sabermetric community.

Here's Wyers on defense and WAR:
We are more confident that the gap between their [Reynolds and Johnson] offensive production (measured by OPS, linear weights, or anything in between) is meaningful—that is to say, reflective of what actually happened—than the difference between them in DRS. If you don’t believe me, you can ask John Dewan, who runs Baseball Info Solutions, the organization that collects the data and runs the calculations behind DRS. At SABR Analytics, he was asked about the reliability of those measures, and said:
"I feel like we're getting about 60 or 70 percent of the picture with current defensive metrics versus 80 or 90 percent on offense," said Dewan. "If I knew how to find the other 40 percent, I'd be doing it!"
So, given what we know about the reliability of offensive metrics versus the reliability of defensive metrics in terms of how well they convey what actually happened in-sample, the logical conclusion is that Heyman is right. It is likely that Reynolds was better than Johnson, or that Harper was better than Marte, over the period Heyman was examining. And WAR would be better if it would show that, instead of treating them as equal. We treat one run in DRS equivalent to one batting run above average, but there’s absolutely no reason that we should (or that we have to). Heyman has brought up an area where WAR is “wrong” and it would be useful to make improvements.
Wyers then gets into the larger issue with the current state of sabermetrics by writing,
No, I’m upset because sabermetrics is about asking questions and seeking honest answers, no matter what the conventional wisdom is. The people who have self-selected themselves as sabermetricians have a conventional wisdom that Heyman is questioning, and so reflexively he’s getting attacked. Our sabermetric community is standing in the way of sabermetric progress to the extent that Jon Heyman is being a better sabermetrician than many people who would call themselves one. And that’s a real problem.
This low-rent knockoff Fire Joe Morgan nonsense has to stop. It is well past time for us to stop letting the default mode of communication between baseball researchers and baseball reporters be the one established by sitcom writers. Science involves competing hypotheses, attempts to duplicate each other’s work, and debates that gel into consensus because the weight of evidence eventually becomes too great to ignore. But that kind of healthy debate is increasingly missing from our field....
Each day, new questions are piling up about our purported ability to measure fielding, and we show less and less of an interest in answering them. And in the process, we’re committing some of the same sins we’re so quick to point out in others.
Wyers conclusion is similar to the one I came to when I examined the sabermetric viewpoint that Mike Trout was deserving of the AL MVP over Miguel Cabrera last year. Trout was so far ahead of Cabrera in his positional value, defensive abilities and baserunning acumen that any advantage Cabrera had at the plate was easily wiped away according to every version of WAR.

Then, during spring training, Joe Posnanski wrote a column for NBC Sports in which the Oakland A's director of baseball operations Farhan Zaidi stated that according to the A's valuation system, Cabrera was actually more valuable than Trout by the slightest of margins.

Since the A's system is proprietary, there's no way to test Zaidi's claim. However, it was shocking to me that there wasn't a series of follow-up articles re-examining the AL MVP debate by sabermetric writers in light of Posnanski's column, particularly since they all seemingly felt compelled to write what amounted to the same article arguing that Trout was the obvious choice in the run-up to the voting last year. Isn't it interesting to the sabermetric community of writers that the A's—the organization that turned sabermetrics mainstream by granting Michael Lewis unfettered access to their use of advanced metrics back in 2002—didn't agree with their unanimous assertion that Trout was more valuable than Cabrera last season?

After reading Posnanski's column, I wrote the following for Bleacher Report,
One would assume that Oakland's statistical measurements are more accurate than anything publicly available given that it's been at this for more than a decade. Oakland also used its numbers to help win 94 games last year on a shoestring budget. In light of that, statistically inclined writers should reinvestigate their assumptions, particularly about WAR.
The old-school columnists like Albom will continue to write their name-calling drivel. Those columns are probably part of the reason the newspaper industry is dying a slow death. However, one would expect that stats-based writers would adjust their thinking as new facts become available.
Miguel Cabrera won the AL MVP last year in one of the most hotly contested races in the award's history. Some of the voters clearly chose Cabrera for the wrong reasons, but in the end, they may have gotten it right.
Since I'm just a blogger writing from my grandma's basement on an oft-ridiculed website, no sabermetric writers heard my call for more intellectual honesty and a re-assessment of the MVP debate. Wyers is a better writer than I am who is making a living off of his work for a website that is well-reputed by the sabermetricians. Alas, while his call was probably widely circulated, it seems to have gone equally unheeded to this point.

Rob Neyer, a sabermetric writer and disciple of Bill James, took another look at Miguel Carbera, the 2012 AL MVP debate and the identity of the best player in baseball over the last year-plus today. He was pretty sure that Trout's baserunning and defense still made him the best player in baseball, even if the statistically inclined Oakland A's weren't so sure about that argument last season. Neyer wrote,
And it's worth remembering from time to time that there's more to baseball than just hitting. Fielding matters quite a lot, and baserunning matters a little too. As it happens, there are only six players with more than 9 Wins Above Replacement (Wins+): Trout, Cabrera, David Wright, Braun, Posey, and Robinson Cano....
Metaphysical labels like greatest live forever, though. I remain unconvinced that Cabrera was the greatest player in the American League (or in baseball generally) last year, and I remain unconvinced that Cabrera is the greatest player this year. I'm nearly certain that the greatest player is someone who hits like the dickens and saves a bunch of runs with his glove, too. Which probably means Mike Trout, again.
Neyer is right in that there certainly is more to baseball than hitting. Baserunning and defense do matter. However, he and other sabermetric writers might do well to read Wyers' and Posnanski's columns and rethink their assertions about defense and WAR. If we're only 60 percent of the way to accurately measuring defense, can we confidently assert that Trout is the best player in baseball in large part because of his defensive chops?

Even if we were reasonably confident that our offensive, defense and baserunning statistics could be combined to get us to a version of WAR that was as near to 100 percent accurate as possible, we'd still be dealing with baseball, a game that often seems completely random and incomprehensible to me.

I look at the advanced metrics and I try to also watch a game every day. However, when I watch a three-hour baseball game, I find it nearly impossible to keep my attention on the game the entire time.

I don't know what that has to do with my point. I guess baseball will remain random, mysterious and hard-to-comprehend for me even if WAR becomes a concrete fact instead of an estimate. In the meantime, I wish sabermetric writers would show a bit more humility when dealing with arguments about player value.

Mike Trout may very well be more valuable than Miguel Cabrera based on his speed and defense, but that's an opinion right now, not a scientific truth.

Update:

Well, Rob Neyer clearly doesn't have a problem with humility. He very graciously left a comment on this blog saying, "I didn't say it was a scientific truth. But it's hardly a scientific truth that Cabrera's the greatest player. Which was, in the end, my only real point."

His comment reminded me of a time several years ago when he was writing for ESPN when he very graciously replied to a comment of mine in an article he wrote about the Boston Red Sox.

If I were a former ESPN writer, I doubt that I would ever take the time to leave a comment on some blog I'd never heard of.

Saturday, May 18, 2013

Full Scouting Report on Mark Appel

Mark Appel
RHP
Stanford University
DOB
7/15/1991 (21.10)
Height
6’5"
Bats
Right
MLB ETA
2015
Weight
215
Throws
Right
Current Team
Stanford University
Dates Seen
2012: 3/25, 6/1, 6/18 (TV); 2013: 3/22, 4/19, 5/17
Filed by/date
Mark Reynolds 5/18/13
Acquired  Projected #2 pick of 2013 Draft by Keith Law Have Video?
No
Mechanics
Loads up heavy on back leg, drop-and-drive guy who throws straight over the top. His load on the back leg will cause him to be late with the arm at times. This causes him to be at the belt and above with the fastball and to cast the changeup up and to his armside. When he's at the belt and above, he gets squared up hard. Because he's over-the-top, he doesn't get natural movement on four-seamer. Needs to be out front to drive the ball downhill and get the illusion of sink. Doesn't have much deception in the delivery. Very athletic. Quick out of the stretch, consistently between 1.1-1.3.
#1 Pitch
Slider is a 60 offering at present. Arm angle gives it great tilt. Very tight break on it. He has excellent command of it and the ability to change speeds with it. I've seen it anywhere from 80-88, but it's typically 84-88. He can throw it to steal strikes early in the count like a curve but with more velo. He'll throw it below the zone to put people away. Devastates lefties with back-foot slider. Over-the-top delivery allows the pitch to be tough on both lefties and righties. Won't have the typical platoon split with the pitch. He does throw the occasional hanger, which he'll have to clean up.
Grade: Present 60/Future70
#2 Pitch
Four-seam fastball is consistently 93-97 deep into games. Holds the velocity well. He's a horse. Doesn't get as many swing-throughs on the heater as you'd expect given his velocity. Not as dominant as I expected given that he's a college senior facing a fairly weak crop of hitters in the PAC-12. When he's at the belt to the the letters, he gets squared up. When he's at the knees, there's more life on the ball and they beat it into the ground. Has excellent control, but command within the zone is inconsistent and hasn't improved since last year. Needs to learn to pound the knees then go above the letters to change the sight-line. Not at all afraid to pitch inside. Has a hard time commanding the four-seamer to his armside to lefties. Throws a two-seamer with some armside run at 92-94. The two-seamer/slider combination should help him neutralize lefties as he develops the change.
Grade: Present 55/Future 65
#3 Pitch
The changeup is the pitch that needs the most work. He'll cast it up and away, or bounce it at 55 feet without enticing the hitter in either case. Will flash plus at times. Good velo difference from the fastball at 82-86. The slider is good enough for him to remain a starter even if this pitch doesn't develop further.
Grade: Present 40/Future 55
Other
He's a horse that can take the ball deep into games and hold the velocity deep into his pitch count. More stoic than fierce on the mound, which is fine for me. Has pitched through adversity in two of the starts I've seen this year as the Stanford outfield defense has been atrocious. Serious Christian. Stanford kid, so probably smarter than most, too. Athletic and quick to the plate. Not as dominant or polished as I want right now given the plus velocity and slider. Pitchability isn't as advanced given his smarts and experience. Changeup consistency and fastball command have not improved for me since last year. Would be smart to develop a 75-78 mph curveball given the high arm slot to further neutralize lefties and give him another offspeed pitch as change develops. Since everything he throws is hard (fastball is 92-97, slider is typically 84-88 and change is 82-86), developing a slow curve would give him more deception via the change of speed.
Overall
Appel has the size, smarts, mentality, velocity and stamina to be an ace. Athletic. Quick to the plate. Pounds the strike zone with his fastball and slider all night. Not afraid to pitch inside. Plus velocity and slider. Not as dominant or polished as I want right now given that plus velocity and slider. Changeup consistency and fastball command have not improved for me since last year. If you put him in the big leagues tomorrow, he's Edwin Jackson with better control. If he can learn to consistently command the fastball down in the zone and further develop a changeup or come up with a curve, he's got ace potential. If not, he's a mid-rotation starter that can eat innings, miss bats but will get pounded at times due to lack of fastball command and movement. Plenty of room for development given the velocity and frame. Some risk here for a potential 1-1 given the lack of dominance as a college senior, but his floor is high enough to mitigate that risk if this is as good as it gets.
OFP: 70; no. 1 starter
Risk Factor: Moderate


(This report is based off my reading of the Baseball Prospectus article 'Eyewitness Accounts)